

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00029 061744Z

43

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-11 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

NSC-05 /090 W

----- 089711

P 061643Z FEB 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1410

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0029

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF

FEB 3, 1976

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0024 (DTG 050926Z FEB 76)

DUE TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT, THE TALKING POINTS  
CONTAINED IN PARAS 17 THROUGH 21 OF REFTEL ARE INCORRECTLY  
WORDED. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ACTUAL VERSION OF THIS PORTION  
OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS OF FEB 3, 1976,  
GIVING THE LANGUAGE APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP AND ACTUALLY  
USED WITH THE EAST.

17. UK REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO  
THE SUMMARY BY THE POLISH REP OF THE VARIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00029 061744Z

PUT FORWARD OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. WESTERN REPS HAD OF

COURSE AT VARIOUS TIMES EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS ON THESE PROPOSALS. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS WOULD UNDERSTAND IT IF ON THE PRESENT OCCASION UK REP DID NOT IMMEDIATELY REPEAT THESE VIEWS. UK REP SAID HE WOULD INSTEAD PREFER TO RETURN TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WHICH WESTERN REPS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO DISCUSS IN THE FIRST PLACE. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, UK REP CONTINUED THAT, ON DEC 16, WESTERN REPS HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT NEW OFFER DESIGNED TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND BRING AGREEMENT. THE ALLIES HAD ADDED TO THEIR PREVIOUS REDUCTION PROPOSALS AN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN A COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. THIS OFFER WAS A SUBSTANTIAL ONE OF GREAT MILITARY IMPORTANCE.

18. UK REP SAID THE WEST WAS OFFERING ON A ONE-TIME BASIS TO REDUCE A LARGE NUMBER OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AND TO REDUCE THOSE US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE AREA WITH THE GREATEST RANGE AND STRIKE CAPABILITY. THE ALLIES WERE IN ADDITION PREPARED TO APPLY SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS TO THE RESIDUAL LEVELS OF WITHDRAWN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF THESE TYPES. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO WITHDRAW AND LIMIT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. THUS, THE ALLIES HAD INTRODUCED A MAJOR NEW FACTOR INTO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE A DECISIVE MOVE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND THE ASSOCIATED RISK OF ESCALATION. WHEN PUT INTO EFFECT, THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO A STABLE SITUATION IN WHICH THESE RISKS WOULD BE MINIMIZED.

19. UK REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN NUCLEAR REDUCTION PROPOSAL MET IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCERNS; THROUGHOUT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED FOR REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. THE ALLIES HAD NOW PROPOSED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, AND WITHOUT ASKING FOR INCREASED REDUCTIONS FROM THE EAST.

20. UK REP SAID THAT TO ACCOMPLISH THE AIM OF REDUCING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION, THE WEST CONSIDERED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD LEAD TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00029 061744Z

AS THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED. TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, THE WEST HAD NOW OFFERED ON A ONE-TIME BASIS TO REDUCE AND LIMIT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: AN ADDITION OF GREAT MILITARY IMPORTANCE. THE COMPOSITION OF REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE DIFFERENT. THIS WAS WHAT ALLIED REPS CALLED THE "MIXED-PACKAGE" APPROACH. IN SUCH A MIXED-PACKAGE APPROACH, WHERE THE COMPOSITION OF THE REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE WAS DIFFERENT, ONE

HAD TO CONSIDER THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REDUCTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS ON EACH SIDE AS A WHOLE, RATHER THAN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION ELEMENTS. WHEN EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE REDUCTIONS THE WEST PROPOSED, THE WEIGHT OF THE LIMITATIONS THE ALLIES WOULD ACCEPT, AND THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE FORCES OF THE USSR -- WHOSE TERRITORY ADJOINED THE AREA -- WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SIMILAR LIMITATIONS, THEN THE WEST WAS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT WAS ASKING FOR: THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY PLUS A COMMITMENT TO MAKE THE REMAINING REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH IN PHASE II THE COMMON CEILINGS THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED.

21. UK REP SAID THAT BECAUSE WHAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING TO DO ON ITS SIDE WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT THE ALLIES WERE ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST, IT COULD NOT BE CONTENDED THAT THE WEST WAS AIMING AT CHANGING THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL EUROPE TO ITS ADVANTAGE. THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE WAS AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY. THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSALS THE ALLIES HAD MADE. NEITHER SIDE WOULD DERIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. ALLIED REPS CONSIDERED THE WEST HAD PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE AND PRACTICAL BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD REGARD THE EAST'S REACTION TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AS A VALID TEST OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO AGREE ON EFFECTIVE PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING DETENTE IN EUROPE. RESOR

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, EAST WEST MEETINGS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 FEB 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** morefirh  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976MBFRV00029  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760046-0357  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760275/aaaacnll.tel  
**Line Count:** 142  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 MBFR VIENNA 24  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** morefirh  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 27 OCT 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <27 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <06 JAN 2004 by morefirh>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF FEB 3, 1976  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006